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Qualifying Jurors in Capital Trials: Are Sixth Amendment
Rights Adequately Protected in North Carolina?
The North Carolina judicial system heartily embraces the practice of
death qualification in capital trials.I A jury is deemed death-qualified when it
is purged of all resolute opposition to capital punishment. In North Carolina,
as in all states with capital crimes, the prosecutor may challenge for cause all

prospective jurors who express unequivocally that they would never impose
the death penalty. 2 The rationale for allowing death qualification of a jury is
twofold. First, the prosecution wants to eliminate all jurors who would refuse

to find a defendant guilty of a capital offense, regardless of the evidence, be-

cause of the threat of capital punishment. 3 Second, the prosecution desires a

4
jury willing to impose the death penalty in statutorily defined situations.

Constitutional objections to death qualification, grounded in the sixth amend-

ment, are based on defendants' claims that a death-qualified jury is conviction-prone 5 and that a death-qualified jury does not represent a fair crosssection of the community. 6 In Witherspoon v. Illinois7 the United States
Supreme Court attempted to balance the state's interest in securing a jury ca-

pable of following the law with the criminal defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to an impartial jury composed of a fair cross-section of the

community.8 The Supreme Court held that a death qualification exclusion
was acceptable only when it was unequivocally clear that the excluded pro-

spective juror automatically would vote against the death penalty regardless of
the evidence, and that the attitude of that prospective juror toward capital

punishment would make it impossible for him to follow impartially the law in
determining a defendant's guilt. 9 Exclusion for less would result in a reversal
of the death sentence. 10
Although the conclusion of the Supreme Court is clear, several issues remain unsettled and attacks on death qualification continue. First, the
1. See, e.g., State v. Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C.
26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983); State v. Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983); State v. Ladd, 308
N.C. 272, 302 S.E.2d 164 (1983); State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983); State v.
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28,
272 S.E.2d 183 (1981); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980).
2. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968); White, Death-QuaifledJuries
The "Prosecution-Proneness"ArgumentReexamined, 41 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 353, 354-55 (1980).
3. White supra note 2, at 354.
4. Id at 355.
5. Id at 356.
6. See Colussi, The Unconstitutionalityof Death Pualifyinga Jury Priorto the Determination
of Guili: The Fair-Cross-SectionRequirement in CapitalCases, 15 CRE GHTON L. REv. 595, 596

(1982).
7. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
8. Id at 518-21.
9. Id at 522 n.21.
10. Id In Witherspoon the Court limited its reversal to defendant's death sentence. "Nor
does the decision in this case affect the validity of any sentence other than one of death. Nor,
finally, does today's holding render invalid the conviction, as opposed to the sentence, in this or
any other case." Id at 523 n.21.
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Supreme Court never has defined specifically the situation in which a Wither-

spoon violation warrants reversal of the death penalty.it Second, it is not
clear when a prospective juror has expressed an unequivocal inability to fol-

low and apply the law. 12 Finally, the Court left unanswered the question
whether the sixth amendment rights of a defendant are protected13 adequately
by the death qualification procedure as limited by Witherspoon.
North Carolina consistently has resolved all of these issues against the
capital defendant. '4 In 1983 the North Carolina Supreme Court perfunctorily

dismissed the allegations of five defendants attacking the death qualification
procedure. 15 This note analyzes the practice of death qualification in North
Carolina by examining the background of Supreme Court death qualification
treatment, the application of death qualification in North Carolina capital trials, the North Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of attacks on the state's
death qualification practice, and the available alternatives to the present death

qualification system. The note concludes that death qualification as presently
practiced in North Carolina unnecessarily violates a capital defendant's guaranteed right to a fair trial under the sixth amendment.
The practice of death qualification began at a time when conviction for a
capital offense resulted in an automatic death sentence. 1 6 Consequently, a juror opposed to the death penalty might refuse to find a defendant guilty to
avoid imposition of capital punishment. To promote the impanelling of juries
capable of finding a capital defendant guilty, prosecutors were permitted to
exclude from capital cases jurors who had serious objections to the death penalty.' 7 Because the death penalty is no longer mandatory,' 8 however, the necessity of impanelling a death-qualified jury is not readily apparent.
Furthermore, all states that have retained capital punishment provide for a
bifurcated proceeding in which the guilt and sentencing phases are separate.19
11. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, have tended to clarify the Witherspoon
holding. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
12. North Carolina examines death qualification "contextually." See infra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has not specified whether the unequivocal
refusal to apply the death penalty must be ascertainable from the record. A juror's response of "I
think so" to the question of whether he would refuse to impose the death penalty, however, was
held less than unequivocal. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264-66 (1970). The Supreme Court
has also held that a conviction by a guilt-phase jury chosen in violation of Witherspoon cannot
stand simply because the totality of the record evidences no violation of the spirit of Witherspoon.
See Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (mem.), rev'g 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968). Nor
does the fact that a trial judge has the opportunity to observe and listen to a juror prevent reversal
when the juror's responses on record are equivocal. See Aiken v. Washington, 403 U.S. 946
(1971) (mem.), rev'g 75 Wash. 2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 (1971).
13. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
14. See infra notes 39-48, 108-10, and accompanying text.
15. See State v. Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305
S.E.2d 703 (1983); State v. Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983); State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272,
302 S.E.2d 164 (1983); State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983).
16. See White, supra note 2, at 354-56.
17. Id at 354-55.
18. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983).
19. See White, supra note 2, at 353 n.2. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). The
bifurcated system has been in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Supreme Court has approved the bifurcated system. See,
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Although the concern that jurors, to avoid the death penalty, would not con-

vict a defendant arguably diminishes in the wake of discretionary capital punallow
ishment and bifurcated capital trials, the majority of jurisdictions still
20
prosecutors to excuse for cause jurors opposed to the death penalty.
Counterbalancing the prosecution's desire to impanel a jury willing to
convict and impose the death penalty is the sixth amendment guarantee of the
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. 21 This right guarantees the defendant

a trial before an impartial jury. 22 Any verdict rendered by a less than impartial jury cannot stand, regardless of whether actual prejudice to the defendant

is shown.3 To meet the requirement of an impartial jury, the United States

Supreme Court has held that a jury must be chosen from a venire representing

a fair cross-section of the community. 24 Although the sixth amendment does

not guarantee that each jury must have a representative from each class in the
community, absent a justifiable state interest, systematic exclusion of any class

from jury service is constitutionally unacceptable. 25 This constitutional right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury is extended to state proceedings by the fourteenth amendment. 26 Thus, any sixth amendment issues arising out of the
North Carolina death qualification practice must conform to the Supreme

Court's interpretation.
In Witherspoon the Supreme Court attempted to balance the need to im-

panel a jury able to properly follow the law with the need to protect sixth
amendment guarantees to a fair trial. Prior to this decision, jurors routinely
were excluded for cause from capital juries when expressing any opposition to
the death penalty. 27 The Court rejected such comprehensive exclusions and
limited the sweep of the death qualification procedure, holding that prospec-

tive jurors could be excused for cause only when they unequivocally state that
they would never impose the death penalty, and when jurors state that their

views concerning the death penalty would make it impossible for them to determine guilt impartially.28 Absent one of these exceptions, a juror cannot be
e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (validating a Georgia statute providing for bifurcated
proceedings in capital cases); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (validating a similar Florida
statute).
20. See Colussi,supra note 6, at 598 n.12. This power to excuse, however, was limited by the
Supreme Court in Witherspoon and later decisions. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
21. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
....
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972).
24. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (criminal trial jury should consist of
laymen representative of cross-section of the community).
25. The Court reached this conclusion in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-35 (1975).
The requirements for establishing a systematic exclusion were established in Duren v. Mississippi,
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). See also infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Spence v. State, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968) (79 of 150 jurors excused
for cause due to belief that death penalty was wrong). See also Colussi, supra note 6, at 598 n.12
(outlining history of practice of excluding jurors because of opposition to death penalty).
28. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 & n.21.
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excluded for cause. If veniremen are excluded on any broader basis, the death
penalty cannot be imposed.29 The Witherspoon Court reversed the death penalty sentence imposed by 30a jury from which prospective jurors had been excused on a broader basis.
Several Supreme Court decisions have clarified the holding in Witherspoon. In Adams v. Texas 31 the Court held that the fact that a juror's deliberations merely would be "affected" by death penalty attitudes was not sufficient
for an excusal. The Court found it natural for a juror to take more seriously a
decision concerning a person's life. 32 In Adams a death penalty sentence was
overturned because jurors were excused for cause on a broader basis than that
permitted under Witherspoon.33
In Davis v. Georgia34 the Court held that a death qualification exclusion
was proper only if, prior to trial, a venireman is committed unequivocally to
voting against the death penalty regardless of the evidence. The Court held
that improper exclusion of even one juror would invalidate any death sentence
imposed.35 Thus, it was not necessary to establish systematic exclusion in violation of Witherspoon to warrant a sentence reversal.
The Supreme Court further clarified the Witherspoon test in Boulden v.
Holman,36 in which it addressed the question of how prospective jurors may
be examined during the death qualification voir dire. The Court affirmed the
assertion in Witherspoon that "'[t]he critical question . . . is not how the
phrases employed in this area have been construed by courts and commentators. What matters is how they might be understood-or misunderstood-by
prospective jurors.' "37 The Court held that the questions asked prospective
jurors during death qualification must be phrased so that laymen can understand what is asked and the response can be interpreted properly. This holding reaffirmed the statement in Witherspoon that "[u]nless a venireman states
unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be
29. Id
30. Id at 521-23. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Witherspoon criteria were met
because prospective jurors who stated that their death penalty views would make it impossible for
them to follow the law and the instructions of the trial judge were excluded, See also Keeten v.
Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (upholding state's right to exclude from both
phases of trial jurors whose opposition to death penalty would color their consideration of the
evidence).

31. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
32. Id at 49-50. The Texas statute permitted prospective jurors to be excused for cause when
their death penalty attitudes would "affect" their deliberations. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974). The State argued that the statute and Witherspoon offered alternate
grounds for excusal. The Supreme Court rejected this suggestion, holding that Witherspoon was
limiting and therefore excusal on broader statutory grounds was error. Adams, 448 U.S. at 48-49.
33. Adams, 448 U.S. at 49.
34. 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
35. Id at 123.
36. 394 U.S. 478 (1969).
37. Id at 48 12 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9).
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If a juror cannot understand the ques-

tions put forward during voir dire, it is impossible to determine if his answers
are unambiguous and unequivocal.
In summary, to conform with Supreme Court decisions, death qualification can exclude only those jurors who would vote automatically against the
imposition of the death penalty or who are unable impartially to determine
guilt because of death penalty attitudes. Voir dire questions should be asked in
such a way that veniremen understand the questions and the significance of

their responses. Finally, the improper exclusion of even one prospective juror
is sufficient to mandate reversal of a death sentence. North Carolina practice

must be analyzed in light of these limitations.
39
There is no explicit death qualification statute in North Carolina. The

basis for death qualification is implied from a North Carolina statute authoriz-

ing challenge for cause of certain jurors. 40 Despite the absence of a specific

statutory authorization, the practice of death qualification is accepted throughout North Carolina.
Because there are no definite statutory guidelines, there is little uniformity
in death qualification procedures in North Carolina. The basic procedure,
however, is similar to that found in other jurisdictions. Death qualification
41
takes place during voir dire of the jury with the entire jury panel present.

Typically, the prosecutor or trial judge questions prospective jurors concerning
their death penalty attitudes. Often, the questions used by the court or prose-

cutor are unclear and not framed according to Witherspoon limitations.4 2 If,
38. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9. See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per
curiam) (remanding for further consideration of Witherspoon issue).
39. Some states have had statutory authorization for death qualification. See, e.g., Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (Texas death-qualification statute invalidated); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968) (Illinois death-qualification statute invalidated).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(b)(9) (1983) provides in pertinent part:
A challenge for cause to an individual juror may be made by any party on the ground
that the juror.
(8) As a matter of conscience, regardless of the facts and circumstances, would be unable
to render a verdict with respect to the charge in accordance with the law of North
Carolina.
(9) For any other cause is unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.
41. See State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 34, 305 S.E.2d 703, 710 (1983) (whether to allow sequestration and individual voir dire of prospective jurors is a matter for trial court's discretion).
Allowing prospective jurors to be present is unwise for two reasons. First, prospective jurors are
able to hear and see the voir dire of other jurors. This allows them to determine what is necessary
for an excusal for cause. Although jury duty is a responsibility shared by all citizens, many avoid
it if they can find a way. See Brief for Appellant Moore at 33, State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274
S.E.2d 183 (1981) (prospective juror expressed unwillingness to impose death penalty when he
realized he could be excused for doing so). Second, the process tends to prejudice jurors against
the defendant. The constant talk of guilt and capital punishment may convince prospective jurors
prior to trial of the defendant's guilt. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980) (holding that any portion of voir dire concerning death qualification
must be conducted individually and in sequestration); Haney, The Biasing Effect of the Death
Qualification Process (1979 prepublication draft) (study indicating that when voir dire is not conducted on an individual basis, out of the hearing of other potential jurors, bias against defendant
develops).
42. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized this as a problem. See, e.g., State v.-
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after this preliminary questioning, a juror expresses disfavor of capital punish43
ment, there is further inquiry in accordance with Witherspoon and Adams.
Prospective jurors often are excused for cause based on such ambiguous
responses as "I don't think so" or "I don't believe so," when asked whether
they could vote to impose the death penalty." Courts in North Carolina have
uniformly found that although the specific answers are equivocal, the context
of the responses indicates an unwillingness to impose the death penalty. 45
Even in cases in which a juror has been excluded improperly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that there was no reversible error because a systematic exclusion in violation of Witherspoon was not evident from the
46
record.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted a very narrow interpretation of Witherspoon. The court has never analyzed fully the state's death
qualification practice in light of the Wiherspoon decision, yet insists that the
North Carolina practice comports with Supreme Court limitations. 47 PostWitherspoon Supreme Court decisions dealing with death qualification have
been ignored by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The North Carolina
courts analyze death qualification "contextually," meaning that the trial judge
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 56, 292 S.E.2d 203, 240 (Exum, J., dissenting) (questions asked by trial judge

ambiguous-excused juror could not have known meaning), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982);
State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 327, 218 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1975) ("[M]any of the problems growing
out of prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty could be avoided if district attorneys
would prepare and use in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors questions framed according to the clear language of Witherspoon.").
43. See, e.g., State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 53-56, 292 S.E.2d 203, 236-40, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
474 (1982); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135-37, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809-10 (1980).
44. See, e.g., State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983). In Kirkley a juror was
excused for the following answers:
Q: If you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the things the law requires you to
be satisfied about then would you recommend, in accordance with the law, recommend
[sic] a sentence of death, or do you have such strong feelings about the death penalty that
even though you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to those things, you would
not vote for the death penalty?
MRs. McKEE [prospective juror]: I don't feel like I would.
Q: You feel that even though the state had satisfied you of the three elements of the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, that it was sufficiently substantial to call for the
imposition of the death penalty, and that any mitigating circumstances were insufficient
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you still feel that you could not vote for the
death penalty, even though you were convinced of those things?
MRs. McKEE: I don't think I could.
Examination by defense attorney, Mr. Chapman.
Q: Could you tell us what your personal views are on the death penalty?
MRs. McKEE: I'm not sure I know exactly how I feel about it definitely. Given a
certain set of personal circumstances, I might have had one feeling one way and another
feeling the other way.
Id at 206-07, 302 S.E.2d 144, 150. See also State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1,53-56, 292 S.E2d 203, 23940 (Exum, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 136-37,
261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980).
45. See State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 207, 302 S.E.2d 144, 150-51 (1983); State v. Williams,
305 N.C. 656, 664-68, 292 S.E.2d 243, 249-52, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982).
46. See State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 325-27, 218 S.E.2d 327, 330-31 (1975).
47. Id at 325-26, 218 S.E.2d at 330-31. See also State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 205-06, 302
S.E.2d 144, 149-50.
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must determine from the words and manner of a prospective juror how the
juror feels about the death penalty and how those feelings would affect
48
deliberations.

Justice Exum of the North Carolina Supreme Court has written strong
dissents in several death qualification cases. 49 In these dissents, he analyzes

the Witherspoon decision and subsequent Supreme Court decisions affecting
the death qualification issue. One such dissent is found in State v. Pinch.50 In

Pinch defendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder. The jury
found defendant guilty of both offenses and recommended imposition of the

death penalty. The court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced
defendant to death.5 1 Prior to the guilt determination phase of the Pinch trial,

however, the trial court had excused eight veniremen for cause because of
their opposition to the death penalty. Defendant argued that he was deprived
52
of the "constitutional rights of due process and trial by jury."

The majority opinion in Pinch routinely dismissed defendant's contentions. The Witherspoon holding was mentioned briefly as the "applicable constitutional standard." 53 The majority found that seven of the eight excused
jurors had expressed unequivocally that they could never impose the death

penalty and that their excusal was proper in light of Witherspoon.54 Although
the statements of the eighth juror concerning the death penalty were equivocal, the majority concluded that "[c]onsidering her answers contextually, we
find that [the putative juror] expressed a sufficient refusal to follow the law."55
48. See supra text accompanying note 45.
49. See, e.g., State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 38-61, 292 S.E.2d 203, 230-43 (Exum, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 139-50, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811-18
(1980) (Exum, J., dissenting).
50. 306 N.C. 1, 38, 49-56, 292 S.E.2d 203, 230, 236-40 (Exum, J, dissenting), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 474 (1982).
51. Id at 7, 292 S.E.2d at 212.
52. Id at 9, 292 S.E.2d at 213.
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id One excused juror had responded to some of the district attorney's questions as
follows:
Q: I understand this is a tough area, but we have to inquire about this now and everyone is entitled to their own opinion. Are you saying, Ma'am that you could not and you
would not vote to impose the death penalty in this case, regardless of the evidence?
A: I don't know. I guess if it was proven to me, I guess I could.
Q: If what was proven to you?
A: I would have to be-I would have to absolute [sic] know for sure, I mean no doubt
whatsoever.
Q: You could not impose the death penalty regardless of what the evidence is?
A: I don't believe so.
MR. WANNAMAKER [district attorney]: If your Honor please, we challenge for cause.
THE COURr. I understand, Mrs. Neal. I know this is very difficult for you, but it's
necessary to have your candid and frank answers and I thank you for them. Do I understand that you could not even before you hear the testimony under any circumstances,
impose the death penalty?
MARY D. NEAL [prospective juror]:

No, I just don't think so.

Id at 54-55, 292 S.E.2d at 239 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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Justice Exum's dissent in Pinch analyzed the Witherspoon decision and

subsequent Supreme Court decisions that aid in the evaluation of death-qualification practices. 56 He concluded that at least two prospective jurors had
been excluded improperly for cause.5 7 Although the majority thought the

proper standard was whether it was established that a potential juror "'would
automaticalo vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case,' "58 Justice Exum determined that Witherspoon had been more explicit in its
guidance. Quoting extensively from Witherspoon, Justice Exum identified key
language in that decision. 59 According to Justice Exum's interpretation of

Witherspoon, the prospective juror must make it "unmistakably clear" that he
is "irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against [the penalty of death] regardless of the facts and circumstances" that might emerge in
the course of the proceedings, before excusal for cause is proper. 60 This inter-

pretation is consistent with several
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that
61
Justice Exum also discussed.

56. Id at 49-56, 292 S.E.2d at 236-40 (Exum, J.,dissenting).
57. Id at 49, 292 S.E.2d at 236-37 (Exum, J., dissenting).
58. Id at 9, 292 S.E.2d at 213 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522
n.21).
59. Id at 49-50, 292 S.E.2d at 237 (Exum, J., dissenting).
"A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the
discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes
as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded cannot perform the
task demanded of it . . . .[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and
capital punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less--than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. . . . [A] jury composed exclusively of. . .people [who believe in the death penalty] cannot speak for the
community. Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishmentof all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty--such a jury can speak
only for [those who believe in the death penalty]."
"If the State had excluded only thoseprospectivejurorswho stated in advance oftrial
that they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the
resulting jury was simply 'neutral' with respect to penalty. But when it swept from the
jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and
all who opposed it in principle, the State crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a
jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."
Id at 49-50, 292 S.E.2d at 237 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 5 19-21)
(emphasis added in Pinch).
Justice Exum added:
"[A] prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in
fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him. The most that can be demanded
of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided
by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before trial has begun, to vote
against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge
in the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that
the veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot
be carried out. ....
"
Id at 50-51, 292 S.E.2d at 237 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21).
60. Id at 51, 292 S.E.2d at 237-38 (Exum, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 51-53, 292 S.E.2d at 237-39 (Exum, J., dissenting). See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980) (juror may not be excused simply because deliberations "affected" by death penalty attitudes); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) (if even one juror is excused in violation of Witherspoon, death sentence cannot stand); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84
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later decision, Duren v. Missouri,9 6 the Court placed the burden upon defend-

ant to prove that a jury was not representative. 97 Once a defendant establishes
the prima facie case of an unrepresentative jury, the state must justify the

practice causing systematic exclusion. 98 If systematic exclusion is shown, it is
presumed that the defendant was prejudiced. 9 9

These arguments-that death qualification results in a conviction-prone
jury and that death qualification denies a defendant his right to a representa-

tive jury-call into question the conviction, as well as the death penalty sentence of a capital defendant. Several courts have analyzed the studies on death

qualification and have considered the fair cross-section argument as it affects
the validity of the defendant's conviction. 10 0 Until recently, both arguments
have been rejected. 10'

In 1983 and 1984, however, two federal district courts accepted both arguments and held that death qualification prior to the guilt phase of the capital

trial is unconstitutional and a conviction rendered by a death-qualified jury
must be reversed.'0 2 One of these decisions, Keeten v. Garrison,0 3 was ren-

dered by Judge McMillan of the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina. Several studies were presented to the court in
Keeten. Judge McMillan held that these studies clearly established that death
qualification yielded a conviction-prone jury.' ° n In addition, Judge McMildistrict. Id at 531. The result in Taylor is consistent with Justice Douglas's opinion that death
qualification should be forbidden because it results in the "systematic exclusion of qualified
groups, and the deprivation to the accused of a cross-section of the community for decision on
both his guilt and his punishment." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 528 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Previous Supreme Court decisions had forbidden the exclusion of various classes from a jury. See
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (systematic exclusion of blacks violated due process); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans violated due
process); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (systematic exclusion of women violated
due process); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (jury selection system which
systematically excluded daily wage earners invalid); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879) (statute which effectively denied blacks the right to serve as jurors unconstitutional).
96. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
97. The Court declared that:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
defendant must show (I) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury-selection process.
Id at 364. See also United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 168 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Systematic
exclusion must be proven; it will not be presumed.").
98. The state must prove that "a significant state interest [is] manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process. . . that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group." Duren, 439 U.S. at 267-68.
99. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-05 (1972).
100. See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
101. See supra note 100.
102. See Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F.
Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
103. 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
104. Id at 1181-82. Judge McMillan analyzed the results of twelve different studies. These
studies consistently revealed that death qualification resulted in prosecution-prone juries. The
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lan, analyzing death qualification in North Carolina in light of Duren, concluded that defendants had established a prima facie case of systematic
exclusion of a distinct group and that the state interests could be advanced
equally by using a bifurcated jury system as suggested in the Witherspoon
footnote.105 The studies presented on the conviction-prone issue also applied
to the cross-section issue, establishing that those who would never impose the
death penalty were a "distinctive group" for Duren purposes.' 0 6 Keelen
who had been
granted habeas corpus relief to three North Carolina defendants
07
denied relief by the North Carolina Supreme Court.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court has been presented with some of the
same studies as those that were before the Keeten court. 10 8 All contentions
that death qualification violates the defendant's rights to a representative jury
or results in a conviction-prone jury, however, have been rejected. The
supreme court has based its holdings on language in Witherspoon that rejected
the studies presented in that case. 10 9 The majority of the court, however, has
totally ignored the Witherspoon footnote suggesting that a future case might
establish prejudice due to death qualification."10 The Witherspoon footnote
has been discussed by Justice Exum in dissent. In his dissent in State v. Avery,' Justice Exum concluded that defendant had proved both the fair crosssection and conviction-prone jury arguments. Justice Exum analyzed the data
before the supreme court and concluded that defendant had met the stronger
court found a consensus among trial judges and academic authorities that the most critical factor
in a juror's determination of guilt or innocence is the weight of the evidence, Consequently, the
exclusion of those unwilling to impose the death penalty becomes most significant in close cases,
The court concluded that: "It is in these close cases that criminal defendants most need the protection of the Sixth Amendment." Id at 1185. Based on the studies examined and expert testimony,
Judge McMillan found that there is as much as a 10% higher conviction rate in close cases when
juries are death-qualified. Id
105. Id at 1181, 1186-87.
106. Judge McMillan found that those unwilling to impose the death penalty shared common
attitudes toward the criminal justice system that separated them from other groups, even those
generally opposed to the death penalty, and that those attitudes favored the defense. Id at 1181.
If these persons are excluded from jury service, "[n]o one else will represent their strong viewpoint
on the jury in their absence." Id at 1182 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1283
(E.D. Ark. 1983)). In addition to finding that those unwilling to impose the death penalty shared
common views and attitudes, the studies showed that a disproportionate number of blacks and
women are excluded due to death qualification. Id See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp.
1273, 1283 (E.D. Ark. 1983); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 144-45, 261 S.E.2d 803, 814-15 (1980)
(Exum, J., dissenting). Thus the group excluded by death qualification is distinct and identifiable,
in attitude, composition, and size.
107. Keeten, at 1187.
108. In his dissent in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980), Justice Exum analyzed several studies. Among them were Boehm, supra note 86; Harris-1971, supra note 86;
Jurow, supra note 86; Ziesel, supra note 86. Professor Ziesel has appeared before the North Carolina Supreme Court. See 299 N.C. at 143-45, 261 S.E.2d 813-14 (Exum, J., dissenting).
109. The court has insisted on quoting the following Witherspoon language: "We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that
exclusion ofjurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue
of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 5 17-18. See,
e.g., State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 137, 261 S.E.2d 803, 810 (1980).
110. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
II. 299 N.C. 126, 139-40, 147, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811, 816 (1980) (Exum, J., dissenting).
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evidentiary showing suggested by the Witherspoon court.1 12 Justice Exum applied the Duren reversal requirements and concluded that those who would
never impose the death penalty do form a distinct, identifiable group and that
death qualification results in the systematic exclusion of that group. 1 3 In addition, Justice Exum found that the data indicated that those not opposing the
death penalty did favor the prosecution. 14 The evidence was more persuasive
than that available to the Supreme Court in Witherspoon;' 5 death qualificajury that was not impartial as required by
tion resulted in a conviction-prone
16
the sixth amendment.
Is Witherspoon adequate protection for capital defendants? To determine
the adequacy of Witherspoon there must be two levels of analysis, the adequacy of protection at the guilt stage and the adequacy of protection at the
sentencing stage of the capital trial.
Witherspoon and the subsequent Supreme Court decisions afford a capital
defendant adequate protection at the sentencing stage of trial. It is accepted
that those who automatically would vote against the death penalty in any case
should be excluded from sentencing because they are unable to apply the law
impartially.1 17 Supreme Court limitations forbid the exclusion of those with
less than unequivocal resolution never to impose the death penalty. If death
qualification practices truly conformed with the Supreme Court standards, the
constitutional rights of capital defendants would be protected at the sentencing
phase of their trials. North Carolina practice, however, does not conform with
those Supreme Court limitations.
Witherspoon does not, however, afford adequate protection at the guilt
phase of a capital trial. The Court in Witherspoon left open the possibility that
defendants might establish prejudice from death qualification at the guilt
phase of trial. 118 Although at the time Witherspoon was decided a single jury
decided guilt and fixed the sentence, the Court recognized two separate jury
functions.' 19 Presently, all states that retain capital punishment provide for a
bifurcated jury system in capital trials.' 20 The Witherspoon Court suggested
that a bifurcated trial, in which separate juries determine guilt and sentence,
would adequately protect a capital defendant should death qualification ever
be proved to result in a less than impartial jury at the guilt phase.12 1 Because
112. Id at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816 (Exum, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 145, 261 S.E.2d at 815 (Exurn, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 143-47, 261 S.E.2d at 813-16 (Exum, J., dissenting).
115. Id at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816 (Exum, J., dissenting).
116. Justice Exum based his dissent on the fact that death qualifying resulted in an unrepresentative jury, depriving defendant of his right to a jury of a fair cross-section of the community.
Justice Exum concluded, however, that "studies and data presented in this case do consistently
and forcefully suggest that a jury culled of those who would not vote for the death penalty is in
fact a jury prone to convict on the guilt phase." Id at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816 (Exum, J.,

dissenting).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Keeten at 1183.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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state courts probably are unwilling to use separate juries absent a mandate
from the United States Supreme Court, 122 the Supreme Court should mandate
one of two procedures. The more extreme and costly option would be to require entirely separate juries to determine guilt and the appropriate sentence.
The more practical option is to forbid death qualification at the guilt phase,
but allow excusal of those who would refuse automatically to impose the death
penalty at the sentencing stage. Those excused could be replaced by alternate
jurors. The North Carolina death penalty statute could be read to provide for
this second option,123 but the North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted
the statute to require a single jury. Therefore, the guidance of the United
States Supreme Court is necessary to force the steps to protect adequately the
rights of capital defendants. It is likely that the Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to render such guidance as Keeten and Grigsby v. Mabry, t24 a
second case reversing defendant's conviction on death qualification grounds,
are appealed.
Until the North Carolina Supreme Court properly applies the standards
established in Witherspoon and the United States Supreme Court provides ad122. See e.g., State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 260, 283 S.E.2d 761, 769 (1981), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3552 (1983) ("lit is intended that the same jury should hear both phases of the trial unless
the original jury is 'unable to reconvene.' ") (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-2000(a)(2) (1983)).

123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983):
(a) Separate Proceedings on Issue of Penalty.(1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. A capital felony is one which may be
punishable by death.
(2) The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as
practicable after the guilty verdict is returned. If prior to the time that the trial jury
begins its deliberations on the issue of penalty, any juror dies, becomes incapacitated or
disqualified, or is discharged for any reason, an alternate juror shall become a part of the
jury and serve in all respects as those selected on the regular trial panel. An alternate
juror shall become a part of the jury in the order in which he was selected. If the trial
jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of penalty after having determined
the guilt of the accused, the trial judge shall impanel a new jury to determine the issue of
the punishment. If the defendant pleads guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose. A jury selected for the purpose of
determining punishment in a capital case shall be selected in the same manner as juries
are selected for the trial of capital cases.
(3) In the proceeding there shall not be any requirement to resubmit evidence presented
during the guilt determination phase of the case, unless a new jury is impaneled ....
Three provisions in the statute seem to indicate that the legislature did not intend an absolute
"same jury" requirement. First, the statute allows for an alternate juror to become part of the
sentencing jury if any of the convicting jurors are "disqualified" or "discharged for any reason."
This would permit substitution for those unwilling to impose the death penalty who served on the
guilt phase jury. Second, "[i]f the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of
penalty .

. . ,

the trial judge shall impanel a new jury to determine the issue of punishment."

Finally, the legislature made provision for a second presentation of evidence in the event a new
jury is impanelled for sentencing.
The only argument made against bifurcated trials by the State in Kee/en was that the cost
"would be too much of a burden

. . .

on the taxpayers." Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1186. The

argument was dismissed summarily by the court. "Such costs, if any, are trivial compared with
the human rights and constitutional issues at stake." Id at 1167-68. "North Carolina can afford
the few extra dollars, if any, that it might cost to provide fair trials to persons accused of capital
felonies." Id at 1187.
124. 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
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equate guidelines eliminating death qualification at the guilt phase of capital
trials, it appears that the rights of North Carolina capital defendants will continue to be violated. The existing law in North Carolina provides for adequate
protection of capital defendants' sixth amendment rights. This law, however,
has been thwarted by the North Carolina Supreme Court's limited
1 25
interpretation.
A criminal defendant has a guaranteed right to be tried by a jury of his
peers. This jury must be impartial and composed of a representative crosssection of the community. Anything less violates a defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Death qualification prior to a determination of guilt
threatens not only the liberty of North Carolina defendants, but the very life
that both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions have long
sought to protect and preserve.
RAMONA J. CUNNINGHAM

125. In 1983 five North Carolina defendants appealed their convictions and death penalty
sentences. In each case, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected any attacks on death qualification and refused to reexamine its position. This position will continue to allow the sixth amendment rights of capital defendants to be violated in North Carolina.

